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Introduction
Whether capital may move freely in and out of a country, is a policy decision taken by national governments and central banks. While capital flows may contribute to an efficient allocation of capital both in geographic and intertemporal terms, their volatility and speculative nature have aroused concern: The positive temporary growth effects of capital account liberalization as predicted by the neoclassical growth theory might be offset by the negative effects of recurrent financial instability and crises. Countries' capital account policies have to take these potential costs and benefits into account. This paper reconsiders the determinants of capital account policy. The existing literature on the causes and consequences of capital account liberalization is extensive. 1 This paper adds to this literature applying two novel approaches: First, it analyses the determinants of policy changes as opposed to policy reversals and, second, focuses on policy interactions among countries.
While other studies have investigated the determinants of capital account liberalization 2 or examined cross-country differences in financial openness, this paper explicitly considers policy changes. Whereas the existing literature examines large and permanent changes in capital account policy, I also include policy changes that are small or temporary. After many countries have liberalised their capital accounts, there is room for policy adjustments: Capital account policy, like the temporary re-imposition of controls, can be used strategically and hence has become an instrument of international economic policy. The paper tries to identify the factors that drive a country's capital account policy.
The existing literature focuses on economic and political characteristics of a country as potential determinants of its capital account policy. While concentrating on country fundamentals, this approach disregards one possibly important factor: Policy spillovers across countries.
Capital account policies might be contagious in the sense that countries copy their neighbours' policies. In the literature on financial crises, contagion is defined as a significant increase in the probability of a crisis conditional on a crisis occurring in another country.
Analogously, policies might be driven rather by policy changes in other countries than by domestic fundamentals. In this case, the series of an index of capital account openness would show a significant degree of co-movement across countries, which cannot be explained by fundamental determinants of capital account policy.
The analysis of macroeconomic policy interactions among countries has a long tradition.
Whereas the traditional focus is on interactions of countries' monetary, fiscal and trade policies, countries' capital account policies might also be characterised by international linkages. In the case of trade policy, a country's openness is influenced by the policies of trading partners. Since changes in tariffs and barriers to trade are usually the result of bi-or multinational negations -even institutionalised by the WTO -a country's policy is driven by the general tendency: A country might only agree to liberalise its barriers to trade if its trading partners also do so. Hence, in trade policy the co-movement of policies is a result of the bargaining process. In the case of capital account openness, this co-movement of policies might also be present although for different reasons. Nonetheless, existing empirical studies generally assume that the capital account policy is driven by domestic factors.
To my knowledge there are only two papers that include the notion of policy interactions in their analysis of capital account policies. Leblang (1997) augments the set of domestic determinants of capital controls by a systemic variable that is exogenous to the domestic economy. He assumes that the increasing de facto financial integration raises the cost of capital controls and therefore increases the incentive to liberalize the capital account. 3 The empirical results do not support his hypothesis: Whereas the relationship between de facto and de jure financial openness is insignificant for OECD countries, they are negatively correlated (contrary to the hypothesis) in non-OECD countries. Simmons and Elkins (2004) investigate interdependent state behaviour in discrete shifts between policy regimes. They conclude that capital account liberalization, the decision to move from a closed to an open capital account, is influenced by international economic competition. Models that only consider domestic determinants of policy are misspecified. 3 He disregards the fact that de facto financial integration is affected by capital account policy. De facto financial integration is neither systemic nor exogenous to a given country. Gassebner et al. (2010) use a similar econometric approach to investigate whether economic reforms in one country are influenced by reforms adopted by other countries. They find evidence for the importance of reforms in geographically and culturally proximate countries.
The following analysis restricts its attention on de jure capital account openness since it is driven by policies. De facto capital account openness, which may be measured by the flows or stocks of cross-border capital, is a different concept. De facto capital account openness is expected to depend on the de jure openness to the degree that controls are effective and difficult to evade. Aizenman and Noy (2009) find weak evidence that de jure restrictions on capital flows reduce de facto financial openness. Dooley (1996) concludes that controls have been effective in sustaining yield differentials between domestic and foreign investments. This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes possible interactions among countries' capital account policies. To motivate the empirical work, section 3 develops a game-theoretic model of countries' best response to capital account policies in other countries. Section 4 presents the econometric methodology. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and the final section concludes.
Contagious capital account policy
Capital account policy is usually regarded as being driven by domestic factors, economic and political ones. However, there are several reasons why domestic capital account policy might be affected by neighbouring countries' policies. The interaction among countries might have three different causes: economic competition, signalling externalities and information diffusion.
Economic competition: If a country dismantles capital controls, it reduces the cost imposed on foreigners who invest domestically. Their net-of-tax return rises. As a result the country attracts capital inflows whose counterpart are capital outflows in countries, which have become less attractive investment places due to the other country's policy. Capital outflows will especially be notable in countries of the same geographic region since empirical studies have shown that international investors allocate capital to regions rather than specific countries. As a result, a neighbouring country that wants to prevent capital outflows has to copy its neighbour's policy and liberalise its capital account as well.
If a country raises capital controls, this reduces foreign investors' net return and leads to a reallocation of capital to other countries. Hence, countries benefit from the imposition of controls elsewhere.
Signalling externalities: The use of capital controls might also produce negative externalities:
Their imposition might be interpreted as a signal of worsening fundamentals. The country fears a speculative attack and therefore impedes capital outflows. Neighbouring countries might be affected by this policy by various channels: First, investors might again consider the region as a sum and assume that fundamentals in the neighbouring countries have worsened, too. Therefore, they withdraw their capital from neighbouring countries. Second, even if fundamentals are independent between countries, investors might fear that a currency crisis in the centre country spreads to neighbouring countries due to contagion. As a result, they will also withdraw their capital. Third, investors might fear that the country fears that investors withdraw their capital because of the two points made before. Therefore, investors expect the country to impose capital controls. In consequence, investors try to withdraw their capital before the country prohibits capital repatriation. All three points indicate that the imposition of capital controls in one country induces capital outflows in the other country. The country may prevent this capital outflow by a simultaneous imposition of capital controls. Hence, investors' expectations regarding capital account policy might become self-fulfilling. This strain of argumentation shows that contagious crises might lead to contagion in policies.
Information diffusion:
The use of a certain capital account policy -i.e. the introduction of capital outflow controls -provides information of its effects and potential benefits for other countries (demonstration effect). Countries learn from a successful policy implementation elsewhere. A positive experience with a policy leads to a re-examination of this policy tool in other countries.
If other countries recently changed their capital account policy, a government can more easily justify an equal adjustment of its policy and enforce this policy against the pressures of interest groups. When neighbours relax capital controls it becomes harder to justify them politically and economically.
All these arguments point to the fact that capital account policies cannot be considered independently from other countries' policies. Besides domestic factors, there is a role for international interdependencies. As described above, interdependencies might be the result of economic competition, signalling effects and information diffusion.
Resource flow model
This strategic interaction among countries can be modelled in the framework of a resource flow model (see Brueckner 2003) . In this model, a country is affected by the amount of a resource that is employed within its borders. While the global level of this resource is given, its distribution between different countries depends on the policy choices of all countries.
Hence, a country chooses the level of a decision variable z i but it is also indirectly affected by the decisions in other countries, z -i . This model has been applied to international corporate tax competition, both theoretically and empirically (see Brueckner and Saavedra 2001 and Devereux et al. 2008) . 4 Since capital controls decrease the expected return of foreigners' domestic investment, they can be considered as an indirect form of taxation. 5 Consequently, the model can directly be applied to countries' choices with regard to their capital account policy.
Assume that country i's objective function Ṽ is given by:
where s i is the level of domestic assets held by foreigners and X i is a vector of characteristics of country i, on which preferences depend. The level of foreign investment depends on the capital account policy of all countries as well as on characteristics of the domestic economy:
(2) X i contains economic variables like corporate tax rates and the domestic return on capital as well as institutional variables like political stability and corruption. After substituting (2) into
(1), the reduced form of the model can be written as:
This objective function is maximised by choice of z i resulting in a reaction function of the form ( )
Hence, the capital account policy of country i depends on its characteristics X i and on the capital account policy in the rest of the world. In this general form, the slope of the reaction function can take either sign.
What are the consequences of changes in other countries' capital account policy? Let us assume that in the status quo world capital is distributed across countries such that its net return is equalised. Moreover, z i has been chosen such that country i's objective function is maximised.
There are two channels through which the choice of z i affects domestic welfare: First, the capital account policy determines the amount of foreign capital within the domestic economy.
A unilateral removal of capital controls leads to a higher level of capital per worker. This increases labour productivity and consequently labour income. The growth rate of output increases temporarily. Capital account restrictions, in turn, decrease the return on domestic capital and render investment projects inefficient that would be profitable without capital account restrictions. 6 The relationship between capital account policy and the allocation of world capital is formally illustrated in Appendix A. Second, capital account restrictions increase a country's monetary policy autonomy under fixed and managed exchange rates.
They may reduce exchange rate volatility and reduce the risk of sudden capital flight, which might result in a currency crisis. Currency crises, in turn, usually reduce the growth rate of output.
In sum, there is a trade-off between output growth and the reduction of output volatility.
Countries that maximise their utility choose an optimal combination of the level of output and output stability.
It is worth noting that the net return of capital invested abroad depends on the entire vector of z: If one country imposes capital controls, the net return of capital falls in all countries.
Hence, investment projects that so far have not been profitable in countries j≠i, become attractive for foreign capital. Capital leaves the country that raised controls and is redirected to the remaining countries. Labour productivity increases in these countries. As a consequence, raising capital controls has a positive externality for the rest of the world.
Are these theoretical considerations with respect to the influence of capital account openness on the level of output supported by empirical findings? Bekaert et al. (2005) report empirical evidence that the growth rate of per capita output increases after capital account liberalization.
With respect to the relationship between capital account openness and the likelihood of currency crises the findings are ambiguous. While some studies claim that controls increase the risk of currency crises (Bordo et al. 2001; Leblang 2003; Glick and Hutchison 2005) , others find financial liberalization to be positively associated with the occurrence of currency crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998) . The latter emphasise an indirect transmission channel: Financial liberalization increases the probability of banking crises, which, in turn, are positively correlated with currency crises (twin crises).
Countries compete for capital with members of their peer group, namely countries with similar characteristics with respect to country risk, financial development and the level of income. The fact that the process of global capital account liberalization has seen two waves, first in industrial countries (late 1970s and early 1980s) and later in developing countries (late 1980s and early 1990s) is consistent with our theory. Policy interactions primarily take place between countries that are considered similar with respect to investment conditions. Moreover, our theory explains both, the observation of a general trend and the difference in timing for the two country groups.
A game-theoretic model of strategic interactions: growth versus crises
Given these theoretical considerations with respect to policy spillovers across countries, I present a simple model of these strategic interactions. It is assumed that there exist two groups of countries: In the first group capital is relatively abundant and in the other capital is relatively scarce. Since the marginal productivity of capital is relatively high in the latter group, capital flows to these countries.
The strategic interactions affect the group of recipient countries. They compete for the capital of the capital-abundant region. The model examines the interaction between two countries of the inflow group, a domestic country and a foreign country. They can influence the amount of capital inflows by their capital account policy. Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk.
All equations are stated from the perspective of the domestic country. Since countries are assumed to be symmetric, one gets the corresponding equation for the foreign country by putting an asterisk on domestic variables and vice versa.
Assume that governments face the following loss function:
where y represents output and y* its target value. y* may be considered as the maximum where our policy variable z is an index of financial openness with higher values indicating a higher degree of openness. x 1 are country characteristics that affect output. The ρ's are coefficients which are assumed to be pre-determined. If financial openness increases growth, ρ 1 >0. If the foreign country opens its capital account, the world net capital return rises and capital leaves the domestic country (ρ 2 <0). The other determinants x 1 are defined such that higher values increase growth (ρ 3 >0).
The second channel, through which capital account openness affects growth, is an indirect one: Financial openness is expected to be positively associated with the probability of a currency crisis, which, in turn, affects economic growth:
where θ denotes the probability of a currency crisis with 1 0 ≤ ≤ θ
. Financially more open economies are more likely to suffer from a crisis (δ 1 >0). Moreover, changes in capital account policy (Δz) may be regarded as a signal that induces investors to re-examine their investment choices. If a decrease in capital account openness is interpreted as a signal for an ensuing crisis, δ 2 is negative. Accordingly, if the foreign country decreases its capital account openness, investors might fear that the whole region will be affected by a contagious crisis (δ 3 <0). x 2 is a vector of other factors that determine the probability of a currency crisis. These variables are assumed to be independent of the policy choice z.
After combining (6) and (7) and assuming that the output cost of a financial crisis is C 7 , expected output is determined by the following expression:
We now derive the reaction function for the domestic country. Substituting the constraints (8) in the loss function (5) and minimizing the loss function with respect to the country's policy choice z, yields the following reaction function:
To simplify this expression, a term A is created that contains the constants. The reaction function then can be expressed as:
The second order condition for a minimum of the loss function implies that
which means that the overall effect of financial openness on growth is positive, since the direct output effect dominates the output-reducing effect of crises. This assumption is in line with empirical findings (Rancière et al. 2006 ).
The reaction function illustrates how the capital account policy of the domestic country depends on the foreign country's policy. Given our assumptions concerning the signs of the coefficients, the policies are positively related: If one country liberalises its capital account, the other country's best response is to follow this policy and to remove controls as well. If one country raises capital controls, the other country's best response is to imitate this policy.
These reaction functions are depicted in Figure 1 . Their intersection is the non-cooperative Nash solution.
Assume that the reaction function of the foreign country changes such that for each policy z a larger value z* is chosen. This might be induced by a change in the other determinants of output (x 1 ) that increases output. As a consequence, A decreases and the reaction function moves upward. The new Nash equilibrium is characterised by both, a higher value of z and a higher value of z*. This illustrates the case of policy contagion: If a change in fundamentals induces one country to open its capital account, the other country's best response consists in copying this policy even though domestic conditions have not changed.
Empirical strategy
The following section sets the foundations for the empirical analysis: It describes the data set, presents the standard control variables and explains the econometric approach
Data
The empirical analysis is carried out on the basis of a pooled data set of cross-country and time-series observations. It contains annual data from 1970 to 2007 for 160 countries. Since data for several explanatory variables are missing for some countries, the number of countries used in the econometric analysis depends on the particular specification and is indicated in the respective tables. With a few exceptions data are taken from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF and the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. A detailed description of the sample and data sources can be found in the appendices B and C. An index of capital account openness that is based on this information was developed by Ito (2002, 2006) An alternative index of de jure capital account openness is provided by Edwards (2007) . He combines the information of the indices of Quinn (2003) and Mody and Murshid (2005) , which are based on data from the IMF. Country-specific information is used to revise and refine the index. The index is scaled over the range from zero to one hundred where a score of one hundred is equivalent to free capital mobility. Since the index provides data only until the year 2000, regressions including the index cover a reduced period ending in 2000.
Measures of capital account policy

Control variables
In the following section the control variables are presented. The selection of these potential determinants of capital account policy is guided by previous empirical studies in this area (e.g. Leblang 1997; Brune et al. 2001; Glick and Hutchison 2005) .
Development:
The literature on the timing of capital account liberalization emphasises that a developed banking system, prudential regulation and sound institutions are prerequisites for countries being able to benefit from large capital flows (see for example McKinnon 1993; Edwards 1984) . These institutional conditions generally depend on the level of development of a country, for which GDP per capita is a proxy. It is therefore expected that countries with a higher GDP per capita are associated with a more open capital account. out that rent-seeking activities, which might increase in the relative size of the government, explain the resistance to opening the economy (Alesina et al. 1994; Leblang 1997 ). In the empirical analysis relative government size is measured by government consumption relative to GDP.
Trade imbalance:
The balance of the current account relative to GDP is an additional factor that influences capital account policy. Large current account deficits imply that the country accumulates external debt. Capital controls might be used to limit these deficits.
Exchange rate regime: According to the policy trilemma, the objectives of exchange rate stability, monetary independence and capital mobility are mutually inconsistent. Only two out of these three possible objectives can be attained jointly. Capital controls are a means of resolving this policy trilemma: By restricting capital mobility, they allow a country to pursue an independent monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate system. If the domestic currency comes under pressure, the exchange rate peg may be defended by restrictions on cross-border capital flows, which limit the scope for speculation. Therefore, countries with fixed exchange rate regimes are less likely to remove capital controls.
Besides these macroeconomic variables, political factors might also determine a country's capital account policy. A currency crisis is usually defined to occur if the index exceeds its mean plus two standard deviations. Instead of using a binary variable, the continuous index is used in the regression analysis. This has two advantages: First, any threshold value of the index that separates crisis from non-crisis episodes would be arbitrary. Second, the index allows us to investigate whether the strength of pressures on the domestic currency matters for capital account policy.
Stationarity
The validity of the following empirical analysis relies on the assumption that the time-series are stationary. To check the stationarity of our variables, two panel unit root tests are applied: a test of the first generation of panel unit root tests that assumes cross-sectional independence (Breitung (2000) ) and a test of the second generation that relaxes this constraint (Pesaran (2007) ). As proposed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) , before computing the Breitung test statistic, the series are demeaned in order to mitigate the impact of cross-sectional correlation.
The results are reported in Table 1 . The hypothesis of non-stationary series cannot be rejected for some of our variables in levels at conventional levels of significance. However, the results do not point to a unit root in any of the first-differenced series. Since we focus on policy changes, the relevant variables for the empirical analysis are precisely the first-differenced series.
Econometric methodology
As described in the theoretical section, the policy of one country might be influenced by policy decisions in other countries. A country's capital account policy might be driven by the international tendency rather than domestic fundamentals. There might exist a contagion effect that leads to co-movements in capital account policy changes. As weighting scheme I use the classical spatial weighting matrix, which has been used widely for analyzing bilateral trade flows. It is based on the geographic distance between countries.
More proximate countries obtain a larger weight. Hence, I assume that the influence of other countries' policies is inversely related to distance: The closer a country, the stronger its policy correlation.
These weights are calculated as follows: For each country, the maximal bilateral distance is determined. From this value, the individual distances are subtracted such that the most proximate country receives the highest value and the most distant country the value zero. To obtain weights, these values are normalised such that they sum to one for each country.
The following panel equation is estimated:
where α and β are coefficients (β is a vector). X is the matrix of control variables. c i is a country-specific fixed effect and u it the error term. Although α is assumed to be constant across countries, the strength of the interaction effect differs between countries depending on the weights with
Since we are interested in explaining changes in current account policies, the equation is estimated in first differences. Moreover, all control variables X are lagged by one period to limit simultaneity problems.
In estimating interaction models, two issues warrant special attention: (1) the endogeneity of the other countries' policy choices z j and (2) the possible correlation of the error term across countries (spatial dependence).
Strategic interaction implies that the policy choices in different countries are determined jointly. Therefore, the linear combination of weighted z j 's is endogenous and correlated with the error term u it . Estimation by OLS leads to inconsistent results. Therefore, I use an instrumental variables approach: The weighted linear combination of the z j 's is regressed on X i and on the same weighted linear combination of the X j 's. The fitted values of this regression are used as instruments for the weighted linear combination of the z j 's. As shown by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) this approach also solves the second complication, namely spatial error dependence. It arises when omitted variables, which become automatically part of the error term, are correlated across countries. As a consequence, one might observe policy co-movements across countries that are due to the omitted variable but not to policy interactions. The use of panel data may also alleviate the problem of spatial error dependence provided that the influence of the omitted variables can be captured by the country fixed effect. Table 2 presents the results of bivariate regressions: The change in capital account openness is regressed on its weighted change in the rest of the world. Whereas the regression of column (1) contains all countries of our database, the other columns present results for subsamples that are formed according to countries' income level and geographic location. The results
Interactions of capital account policies across countries: empirical results
show that for the full sample domestic capital account policy is driven by policies elsewhere.
If the rest of the world opens its capital account, the domestic economy also liberalises its capital account. The coefficient of 0.4 implies that on average countries liberalise their capital account to a lower degree than the rest of the world. 11 Policy spillovers are present, but countries do not outdo each other. There is no race to the bottom. This finding is consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model in section 3. The regression results for the subsamples show that this behaviour is mainly driven by the Latin American countries. For the other country groups, the policy in the rest of the world does not significantly influence domestic policies. The following tables include the standard set of control variables for capital account policy.
They test whether policy spillovers can be identified in addition to the effects of fundamentals and exogenous shocks.
Column (1) of Table 4 includes the set of macroeconomic control variables. An increase in economic development measured by changes in real GDP per capita reduces capital account openness. This finding, which is not in line with the theoretical predictions, is not robust to alternative specifications (see columns 3 and 4). A fixed exchange rate is associated with more restrictions on capital flows. This effect is consistent with the hypothesis of the policy trilemma. Capital account policy elsewhere triggers domestic policy changes: If the rest of the 11 From a theoretical standpoint it is not plausible that each individual country liberalises less than the rest of the world. However, one has to bear in mind that this coefficient only measures the policy spillovers across countries, that is to say, policy changes that can neither be explained by domestic fundamentals nor common exogenous shocks. Common exogenous shocks (i.e. changes in world interest rates) or country linkages (i.e. in trade openness: an increase in one country necessarily leads to an increase in at least one other country) might be additional factors that lead to co-movements in capital account policies. The last column in Table 4 adds changes in the exchange market pressure index. While currency crisis do not significantly affect capital account policies, the effects of the other variables are qualitatively unchanged compared to column 3.
The full sample consists of a heterogeneous set of countries. Policy making, however, might differ between more homogeneous groups of countries. Therefore, I divide the whole sample in two subsamples.
The results are reported in Table 5 . Columns (1) and (2) replicate the regressions of Table 4 , columns (2) and (4) for a subsample of 22 industrial countries. While the explanatory power of the specifications is low and the majority of control variables is statistically insignificant, the presence of policy spillovers can be confirmed in three out of four specifications.
Columns (3) and (4) With respect to the control variables, two effects are robust to different specifications: The adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime is accompanied by the imposition of capital controls.
On average, countries are aware of the restrictions implied by the policy trilemma.
Restrictions on the capital account are strengthened when real world interest rates increase.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that capital account policies are shaped by the competition for global capital. As a consequence, capital account policies are contagious. (2007) and Breitung (2000) . The p-value shows the level of significance at which the null hypothesis of a unit root in each individual time-series can be rejected. The alternative hypothesis is that all individual series are stationary.
Both tests require a balanced panel data set. Therefore, for each variable a subsample is constructed that contains only those countries, for which data for the period 1975-2006 are available without gap. Since any systematic relationship between the availability of data and the characteristics of the time-series is improbable, the subsample can be considered as a random sample of the population of all countries. The results are sensitive to the number of lags included and to the choice of specification (trend). The inclusion of lags of the variable accounts for serial correlation in the errors. Therefore, results for different numbers of lags -with and without trend -are reported. As proposed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) , before computing the Breitung test statistic the series are demeaned in order to mitigate the impact of cross-sectional correlation. The two variables for exchange rate regimes are not considered since they are dummy variables.
Since the world interest rate is the same for all countries, its characteristics can be analysed by unit root tests for individual time-series. According to the Phillips-Perron test and the augmented Dickey-Fuller test the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 10% level of significance. After firstdifferencing, however, the p-value falls to 0.00. Notes: t-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Notes: t-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Appendix A: Capital account policy and the allocation of capital
Assume that two countries produce a private good using mobile capital (K) and immobile labour (L) via a constant returns to scale production function
where Y denotes output and A measures total factor productivity. In the intensive form this can be written as
where y denotes output per capita and k represents capital per capita. International capital flows to the use with the highest risk-adjusted return. It thereby equalises net-of-tax returns such that in equilibrium its distribution satisfies: * * ⋅
where z and z* are the indices of capital account openness ( 1 0 < < z ). The larger z, the more open the capital account. r is the endogenous worldwide net return. If the domestic country removes capital controls, its net return rises. As a consequence, capital leaves the foreign country and is re-invested in the domestic country. This has two consequences: First, capital per worker rises in the domestic economy. This temporarily increases the growth rate of output during the inflow period and leads to a permanently higher level of output. The country's net return falls until it reaches r. Second, r also decreases. The new equilibrium is characterised by a larger share of world capital invested in the domestic economy and by a lower net return of capital.
